An adaptive k-out-of-N Priced Oblivious Transfer (POT) scheme is a two-party protocol between a vendor and a buyer. The vendor sells a set of messages m 1 , . . . , m N with prices p 1 , . . . , p N . In each transfer phase i = 1, . . . , k, the buyer chooses a selection value σ i ∈ {1, . . . , N } and interacts with the vendor to buy message m σi in such a way that the vendor does not learn σ i and the buyer does not get any information about the other messages.
Introduction
A number of studies [31] show that transaction security and privacy concerns are among the main reasons that discourage the use of e-commerce. Although sometimes it is argued that users who claim to be worried about their privacy do not consistently take actions to protect it, recent research [41] demonstrates that, when they are confronted to a prominent display of private information, they not only prefer vendors that offer better privacy protection but also are willing to pay higher prices to purchase from more privacy protective websites. Therefore, it is of interest for vendors to deploy e-commerce applications where buyers need to disclose the minimum information needed to carry out their transactions.
So far, the solutions proposed to develop privacy-enhancing e-commerce of digital goods can roughly be divided into two categories: those that hide the identity of the buyer from the vendor (anonymous purchase), and those that hide which goods are bought (oblivious purchase). Anonymous purchase [27, 33] usually employs anonymous e-cash [17, 12, 3] to construct systems where buyers can withdraw coins from a bank and spend them without revealing their identity. These systems have several shortcomings. First, they hinder customer management (e.g. the vendor cannot easily apply marketing techniques like giving discounts to regular buyers). Second, they do not allow for other methods of payment. Finally, strong anonymity is difficult to achieve and there exist several attacks to reduce it [5] .
Oblivious purchase is thus more appealing in scenarios where full anonymity cannot be obtained or when the disadvantages that anonymity causes are important. Oblivious purchase permits effective customer management and allows for every method of payment. Like for anonymous purchase [27, 33] , it has also been shown how to integrate it into existing Digital Rights Management systems [35] . One can argue that, since the vendor does not know which items are sold, he can find it difficult to discover which products are more demanded. However, we note that this information can be obtained from other sources, e.g., by conducting marketing researches. optimal in terms of rounds of communication and has constant computational and communication cost.
Our construction follows the approach in [1] of building a prepaid mechanism where B makes an initial deposit to V. In each transfer phase, B chooses a selection value σ i , proves that she has enough funds to buy message m σ i and subtracts price p σ i from her deposit, while V learns neither p σ i nor the new value of the deposit. For this purpose, B employs a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge that she updates her account correctly and that the new account is non-negative. To allow for the latter we design a noninteractive range proof of knowledge by applying the efficient interactive range proof recently proposed in [11] to the non-interactive proof system due to Groth and Sahai [28] . This is the first efficient noninteractive proof of knowledge in the standard model to prove that a value lies in a given interval we are aware of.
We also employ the assisted decryption approach and some techniques utilized in the adaptive UCsecure OT scheme in [26] . Specifically, we use double trapdoor encryption and we prove security of ciphertexts under the DLIN [9] assumption. Nonetheless, unlike [26] , we make extensive use of Psignatures [4] , i.e., signature schemes that have efficient non-interactive proofs of signature possession, to let B prove that she computes her requests honestly. In particular, we employ a slightly modified variant of the P-signature scheme for signing blocks of messages proposed in [3] , which is secure under the HSDH [10] and TDH [4] assumptions. (P-signatures also utilize Groth-Sahai proofs, which we instantiate using the DLIN assumption.) The use of multi-block P-signatures allows our scheme to have a smaller ciphertext size than the one in [26] . We note that our POT scheme can easily be simplified to obtain an OT scheme, which constitutes an alternative to the one in [26] .
Outline of the paper. In Section 2 we briefly review the universally composable security paradigm and we define the ideal functionality for POT. The security assumptions we use, the Groth-Sahai proof system, and other cryptographic building blocks are described in Section 3. In Section 4 we show how to construct a non-interactive range proof. Finally, in Section 5 we depict the multi-block P-signature scheme and our POT scheme.
Definitions
Adaptive k-out-of-N priced oblivious transfer (P OT N k×1 ). A P OT N k×1 scheme is a two-party protocol between a vendor V and a buyer B. In the initialization phase, V receives messages (m 1 , . . . , m N ) with prices (p 1 , . . . , p N ) as input. B receives an initial deposit ac 0 as input. B stores state information B 0 and V stores state information V 0 and outputs ac 0 . After that, V and B engage in up to k transfer phases. In the ith transfer, V gets state information V i−1 as input, and B gets state information B i−1 and selection value σ i ∈ {1, . . . , N }. If ac 0 − j∈S p σ j ≥ 0, where S contains the indices of all transfers that ended successfully, then V stores state information V i and B stores state information B i and outputs m σ i . Otherwise V stores V i = V i−1 and B stores B i = B i−1 .
Universally composable security. We employ the universally composable security framework [15] with static corruptions to prove security of our construction. In this framework, parties are modeled as probabilistic polynomial time interactive Turing machines. A protocol ψ is UC-secure if there exists no environment Z that can distinguish whether it is interacting with adversary A and parties running protocol ψ or with the ideal process for carrying out the desired task, where ideal adversary E and dummy parties interact with an ideal functionality F ψ . More formally, we say that protocol ψ emulates the ideal process when, for all environments Z, the ensembles IDEAL F ψ ,E,Z and REAL ψ,A,Z are computationally indistinguishable. We refer to Appendix A for a more detailed description of the UC framework.
Our construction operates in the F CRS -hybrid plain model, where parties have access to an honestlygenerated common reference string crs and to authenticated channels. As in [26] , we assume that Z obtains crs from A. This allows the simulator E to set up a crs with trapdoor information to be able to simulate A in the security proof.
Below we recall the description of the ideal functionality for generating common reference strings (F CRS ) [16] . F CRS is parameterized with a distribution D and a set of participants P, which is restricted to contain the buyer B and the vendor V of the POT scheme only. We also describe an ideal functionality for POT (F P OT ) based on the ideal functionality for OT given in [26] .
F CRS . On input (sid , crs) from party P , if P / ∈ P it aborts. Otherwise, if there is no value r recorded, it picks r ← D and records r . It sends (sid , crs, r ) to P . F P OT . Parameterized with integers (N , l ), a maximum price p max , and a deposit upper bound S , and running with a vendor V and a buyer B, F P OT works as follows: -On input a message (sid , buyer , deposit), where deposit ∈ [0, . . . , S ), if a (sid , vendor , . . .) message was not received before, then it does nothing. Otherwise, it stores deposit and sends (sid , deposit) to V.
-On input a message (sid , buyer , σ) from B, where σ ∈ {1, . . . , N }, if either messages (sid , vendor , m 1 , . . . , m N , p 1 , . . . , p N ) and (sid , buyer , deposit) were not received before or deposit −p σ < 0, then it does nothing. Otherwise, it sends (sid , request) to V and receives (sid , b) in response. It hands (sid , b) to the adversary. If b = 0, it sends (sid , ⊥) to B. If b = 1, it updates deposit = deposit − p σ and sends (sid , m σ ) to B.
Technical Preliminaries
A function ν is negligible if, for every integer c, there exists an integer K such that for all k > K, |ν(k)| < 1/k c . A problem is said to be hard (or intractable) if there exists no probabilistic polynomial time (p.p.t.) algorithm that solves it with non-negligible probability (in the size of the input or the security parameter).
Bilinear maps. Let G and G T be groups of prime order p. A map e : G × G → G T must satisfy the following properties:
(c) Efficiency. There exists an efficient algorithm that outputs the pairing group setup (p, G, G T , e, g) and an efficient algorithm to compute e(a, b) for any a, b ∈ G.
Assumptions
The security of our scheme relies on the Hidden Strong DH assumption [10] , the Triple DH assumption [4] , and the Decision Linear assumption [9] :
, the l -HSDH assumption holds if it is computationally hard to output a new tuple (g 1/(α+c) , g c , u c ).
Definition 2 (TDH) On input (g, g x , g y ) ∈ G 3 and a set of tuples {c i , g 1/(x +c i ) } l i=1 , the l -TDH assumption holds if it is computationally hard to output a tuple (g µx , g µy , g µxy ) for µ ∈ Z p /{0}.
Definition 3 (DLIN)
On input (g, g a , g b , g ac , g bd , z) ∈ G 6 for random exponents a, b, c, d ∈ Z p , the DLIN assumption holds if it is computationally hard to decide whether z = g c+d .
Non-interactive Zero-knowledge Proofs of Knowledge
Let R be an efficiently computable relation and L = {y : ∃w |R(y, w ) = accept} be an NP-language. For tuples (y, w ) ∈ R, we call y the instance and w the witness. A non-interactive proof of knowledge system [38] consists of algorithms PKSetup, PKProve and PKVerify. PKSetup(1 κ ) outputs a common reference string crs P K . PKProve(crs P K , y, w ) computes a proof pok of instance y by using witness w . PKVerify(crs P K , y, pok ) outputs accept if pok is correct.
Zero-knowledge captures the notion that a verifier learns nothing from the proof but the truth of the statement. Witness indistinguishability is a weaker property that guarantees that the verifier learns nothing about which witness was used in the proof. In either case, we will also require soundness, meaning that an adversarial prover cannot convince an honest verifier of a false statement, and completeness, meaning that all correctly computed proofs are accepted by the honest verification algorithm. See [23, 22, 7, 21] for formal definitions.
In addition, a proof of knowledge needs to be extractable. Extractability means that there exists a polynomial time extractor (PKExtractSetup, PKExtract). PKExtractSetup(1 κ ) generates parameters crs P K that are identically distributed to the ones generated by algorithm PKSetup and an extraction trapdoor td ext . PKExtract(crs P K , td ext , y, pok ) extracts the witness w with all but negligible probability when PKVerify(crs P K , y, pok ) outputs accept.
We recall the notion of f-extractability defined by Belenkiy et al. [4] , which is an extension of the original definition of extractability (as given by De Santis et al. [38] ). In an f -extractable proof system the extractor PKExtract extracts a value z such that ∃w : z = f (w) ∧ R(y, w ) = accept. If f (·) is the identity function, we get the usual notion of extractability. A commitment scheme has a hiding property and a binding property. Informally speaking, the hiding property ensures that a commitment C to x does not reveal any information about x, whereas the binding property ensures that C cannot be opened to another value x . (When it is clear from the context, we omit the commitment parameters params Com .)
A notation for f -extractable non-interactive proofs of knowledge. We are interested in NIPK about (unconditionally binding) commitments. By 'x in C' we denote that there exists open such that C = Commit(params Com , x, open). Following Camenisch and Stadler [14] and Belenkiy et at. [4] , we use the following notation to express an f -extractable NIPK for instance (C 1 , . . . , C n , Condition) with witness (x 1 , open 1 , . . . , x n , open n , s) that allows to extract all the witness except the openings of the commitments:
The f -extractability of a NIPK ensures that, with overwhelming probability over the choice of crs, if PKVerify accepts then we can extract (x 1 , . . . , x n , s) from π, such that x i is the content of the commitment C i , and Condition(crs, x 1 , . . . , x n , s) is satisfied. To further abbreviate this notation, we omit crs when it is clear from the context.
Applying the notation to Groth-Sahai proofs. Groth-Sahai proofs [28] allow proving statements about pairing product equations. The pairing group setup (p, G, G T , e, g) is part of the common reference string crs P K as output by PKSetup(1 κ ) and the instance consists of the coefficients {a q } q=1...Q ,
that satisfy this equation. Internally Groth-Sahai proofs prove relations between commitments. A homomorphism guarantees that the same relations also hold for the committed values. Normally, as the first step in creating the proof, the prover prepares commitments {C i } i=1...m for all values x i in G. Then, the instance, known to the prover and the verifier, is the pairing product equation alone (i.e., its coefficients).
Additionally, it is possible to add pre-existing Groth-Sahai commitments {C i } i=1...n , n ≤ m, to the instance for some of the x i values. The corresponding openings open i become part of the witness. The proof will be computed in the same way, except that for values with existing commitments no fresh commitments need to be computed. We will write C i ← Commit(x i , open i ) to create Groth-Sahai commitments. Note that they use parameters contained in the crs P K of the Groth-Sahai proof system. The Groth-Sahai proof system generates f-extractable witness indistinguishable 1 NIPK of the form:
P-Signature Schemes
A signature scheme consists of the algorithms Keygen, Sign and VerifySig. Keygen outputs a secret key sk and a public key pk . Sign(sk , m) outputs a signature s of message m. VerifySig(pk , m, s) outputs accept if s is a valid signature of m and reject otherwise. (This definition can be extended to support multi-block messages m = {m 1 , . . . , m n }.) A signature scheme must be correct and unforgeable [24] . Informally speaking, correctness implies that the VerifySig algorithm always accepts an honestly generated signature. Unforgeability means that no p.p.t adversary should be able to output a messagesignature pair (s, m) unless he has previously obtained a signature on m.
P-Signatures are defined by Belenkiy et al. in [4] as signature schemes equipped with a common reference string crs Sig and a NIPK that allows proving possession of a signature of a committed message. Belenkiy et al. show how to use the Groth-Sahai proof system to build this proof. Since in their constructions m ∈ Z p and Groth-Sahai proofs prove knowledge of a witness in G, they need to compute a bijection F (m) ∈ G and prove knowledge of F (m). To avoid that given a secure signature scheme an adversary may still be able to compute a forgery (s, F (m)) even though he is unable to compute (s, m), [4] defines F -unforgeability, which means that no p.p.t adversary can output (s, F (m)) without previously obtaining a signature on m.
Non-Interactive Range Proof
We construct an efficient non-interactive range proof that a committed value σ ∈ Z p lies in an interval [0..A). Our scheme is based on the efficient interactive range proof recently proposed in [11] . The technique of [11] consists in writing σ in base-d to show that it lies in an interval [0..d a ). First, the verifier sends the prover signatures S i on d -ary digits, i.e., i ∈ Z d . Then the prover proves that σ = j∈Za σ j d j and that all σ j are d -ary digits. For the latter, she proves possession of a verifier's signature on σ j . Our idea consists in employing P-signatures, which allow for a non-interactive proof of signature possession, to construct a non-interactive range proof following this approach.
A handy P-signature scheme. We employ the P-signature scheme of [4] that is based on the strong Boneh-Boyen signature scheme [8] .
Setup(1 κ ) runs the Groth-Sahai PKSetup(1 κ ) to obtain crs P K for pairing groups (p, G, G T , e, g), picks random u ∈ G, and outputs crs Sig = (crs P K , u).
Keygen(crs Sig ) picks a secret key sk = (α, β) ← Z p and computes a public key pk = (v , w) = (g α , g β ).
VerifySig(crs Sig , pk , m, s) outputs accept if e(s 1 , vg m s 2 ) = e(g, g), e(u, s 2 ) = e(s 3 , w). Otherwise, it outputs reject.
Using Groth-Sahai proofs, [4] shows how to construct a NIPK of such a signature. This is a proof of a pairing product equation of the form
We will abbreviate this expression by writing NIPK{(g m , u m , s) : VerifySig(pk , s, m) = accept}. This scheme is F -unforgeable (F (m) = (g m , u m )) under the HSDH and TDH assumptions.
Range proof. The range proof uses a common reference string crs Sig as produced by Setup. In addition, we require that the verifier can distribute public parameters params Range ← RPInitVerifier(crs Sig , A). These parameters do not need to be honestly generated, as they can be verified by the prover using RPInitProver.
RPInitVerifier(crs
RPInitProver(crs Sig , params Range ). It parses params Range to obtain pk and {S i } i∈Z d . It verifies the signatures by computing, for all i ∈ Z d , VerifySig(crs Sig , pk , i, S i ). If these verifications succeed, it outputs accept. Otherwise it outputs reject.
RangeProve(crs Sig , params Range ,g, σ, open σ ) computes the following proof for a commitment
Intuitively, (1) ensures that each σ j is a d -ary digit by proving that the value was used by the verifier to compute a signature S σ j , and (2) proves that σ is correctly decomposed, i.e., that σ = j∈Za σ j d j . We use the short form NIPK{(g σ ) : 0 ≤ σ < A ∧g σ in C σ } to refer to this proof.
This proof is only witness indistinguishable. While this is sufficient for our application, it is possible to make the proof zero-knowledge using techniques described in [28] . This proof can be extended to handle intervals of the form [A..B) in the same way as in [11] .
5 A UC-Secure Adaptive k-out-of-N Priced Oblivious Transfer Scheme
Intuition Behind our Construction
Our priced oblivious transfer scheme is based on the oblivious transfer scheme presented in [26] . Specifically, it is an assisted decryption scheme that employs double trapdoor encryption (based on the linear encryption scheme in [9] ). The ciphertext of message m contains values (w
), where (w 1 , w 2 ) are public parameters generated by vendor V and (h 1 , h 2 , h 3 ) belong to the common reference string. (w
2 ) are used by buyer B to generate the request message in each transfer phase, whereas (h
2 ) are used in the security proof by the ideal protocol adversary E to obtain the messages from V without the necessity of extracting a secret key from a proof of knowledge. This is useful because if the secret key is a value in Z p , then Groth-Sahai proofs do not permit its extraction. In order to be able to decrypt, E creates trapdoor information when generating the crs. (We note that the environment learns crs through the adversary. As mentioned in [26] , there are impossibility results for realizing UC-secure OT if E cannot craft crs.) In addition, by using double trapdoor encryption we also prove the security of ciphertexts under the DLIN assumption.
The message space is {0, 1} l , but we abuse notation and also write m to denote the corresponding group element in G according to some efficient and invertible mapping. We will do the same when encrypting the account ac 0 that is a value in Z p using linear encryption. For such a mappings between a bit string {0, 1} l and an element in G see, e.g., [2] .
The ciphertexts also contain signatures of (w
2 ) that are used to ensure that B generates her requests honestly. [26] employs signature schemes that sign elements in G. However, we use a multiblock P-signature scheme that signs elements in Z p , and thus we sign values (r 1 , r 2 ). Consequently, we need to provide B with the values F (r 1 , r 2 ) = (g
2 ) of this signature scheme. Nonetheless, we note that in our scheme the ciphertexts have less group elements than in [26] .
In order to permit oblivious purchases, our P OT N k×1 extends the OT N k×1 construction sketched above. We follow the approach of [1] of building a prepaid scheme, where in the initialization phase the buyer B pays an initial deposit ac 0 to the vendor V, and in subsequent transfer phases this deposit is subtracted by the price p σ of the message that is being bought.
The POT scheme must ensure that V learns neither the price of the message nor the new value of the account, but also that B pays the right price for the message and that she has enough funds to buy it. To achieve this, in the initialization phase B sends a commitment to the deposit. In the ith transfer, B sends a commitment to the new value of the account ac i and proves that (1) this value is correct, i.e., that ac i = ac i−1 − p σ , and that (2) it is non-negative. In order to allow for (1), we need to ensure that B uses the right price. To accomplish this, V adds the price of the message to the message block (r 1 , r 2 , p σ ). Thanks to that, when B proves possession of the signature, B can include in this proof a pairing product equation to prove that ac i = ac i−1 − p σ . To verify this proof, V employs the commitment to ac i−1 that he got in the previous transfer phase. To achieve (2) , in the initialization phase V computes parameters of the range proof and hands then to B. In each transfer phase, B proves that the new value of the account ac i belongs to [0..A), where A is the deposit upper bound.
P-Signatures for Blocks of Messages
We describe an F -unforgeable P-signature scheme for signing multiple message blocks that is based on the single block scheme presented in [3] . Let m = m 1 , . . . , m n denote n message blocks.
Setup n (1 κ ) runs the Groth-Sahai PKSetup(1 κ ) to obtain crs P K for pairing groups (p, G, G T , e, g), picks random u ∈ G, and outputs crs Sig = (crs P K , u).
Keygen n (crs Sig ) picks random (α, β 1 , . . . , β n , λ 1 , . . . , λ n ) ← Z p and sets a public key Pk = (v , g 1 , . . . , g n , u 1 , . . . , u n ) = (g α , g β 1 , . . . , g βn , u λ 1 , . . . , u λn ) and a secret key Sk = (α, β 1 , . . . , β n ).
) and e(u, s 2 ) = e(s 3 , g). We extend the multi-block signature scheme with a protocol for proving possession of a signature.
NIPK{({g
We use the short form NIPK{({g
VerifySig n (Pk , m, s) = accept} to refer to this proof.
This signature scheme is F -unforgeable under the HSDH and TDH assumptions. We prove Theorem 1 in Appendix B.
We make use of the observation that an F-unforgeable signature scheme can also be verified using the F (m i ) values alone, i.e., without knowing m i . Like in the proof, an additional check of the equations {e(u i , g
is needed to verify that the F (m i ) values are constructed correctly. Moreover, the F (m i ) values are sufficient to create a proof of possession of a signature. We write, e.g., VerifySig n (Pk , m 1 , F (m 2 ), m 3 , s) to indicate that the signature s is verified using only the F value of message m 2 .
Construction
We begin with a high level description of the priced oblivious transfer scheme. The vendor V and the buyer B interact in the initialization phase and in several transfer phases. Details on the algorithms can be found below. We recall that the scheme is parameterized with integers (N , l ) for the number of messages and their length, an upper bound p max for the prices and an upper bound A = d a for the deposit.
Initialization phase. On input (sid , vendor , m 1 , . . . , m N , p 1 , . . . , p N ) for the vendor and (sid , buyer , ac 0 ) for the buyer (that fulfill the restrictions imposed by the parameters of the scheme):
1. V queries F CRS with (sid , V, B). F CRS runs POTGenCRS(1 κ , p max , A) and sends (sid , crs) to V.
2. B queries F CRS with (sid , V, B). F CRS sends (sid , crs) to B.
3. V runs POTInitVendor(crs, m 1 , . . . , m N , p 1 , . . . , p N , A) to compute a database commitment T and a secret key sk , and sends (sid , T ) to B. 
3. B receives (sid , R) and runs POTComplete(crs, T , R, Q (priv ) ) to obtain m σ i .
) and outputs (sid , m σ i ).
POTGenCRS(1 κ , p max , A). Given security parameter κ, it generates two Groth-Sahai reference strings crs V P K and crs B P K for the same pairing group setup (p, G, G T , e, g) such that −p max > A mod p holds. (In the proof of security the two setups allow the simulator to simultaneously make use of knowledge extraction and simulation for the first and the second proof respectively.) It picks random a, b, c ← Z p and computes
POTInitVendor(crs, m 1 , . . . , m N , p 1 , . . . , p N , A). On input the messages (m 1 , . . . , m N ) and the prices (p 1 , . . . , p N ):
1. It parses crs to obtain crs Sig = (crs B P K , u) and (h 1 , h 2 , h 3 ). 2. It picks random x 1 , x 2 ← Z p and sets (w 1 , w 2 ) = (h
).
3. It runs Keygen n to obtain (Pk , Sk ), where Pk = (v , g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ) and Sk = (α, β 1 , β 2 , β 3 ).
4. For i = 1, . . . , N , it encrypts m as follows:
6. It sets pk = (w 1 , w 2 , Pk , params Range ), sk = (x 1 , x 2 ) and T = (pk , C 1 , . . . , C N ). It outputs (T , sk ).
POTInitBuyer(crs, T , ac 0 ). On input a database commitment T and a deposit ac 0 ∈ [0..A):
1. It parses crs to obtain crs Sig = (crs B P K , u), T as (pk , C 1 , . . . , C N ), pk as (w 1 , w 2 , Pk , params Range ) and the public key Pk as (v , g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ).
2. It runs RPInitProver(crs Sig , params Range ) to verify params Range . 2 Note that the set crsSig = (crs B P K , u) is used as common reference string for both the multi-block signature scheme and the single-message signature scheme, which is used for running the range proof. 
4. If not all these checks verify, it outputs reject. Otherwise it picks random (r 1
) and D
POTGetDeposit(crs, P , A). It works as follows:
1. It parses P as (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 , c 5 ).
It computes
2 ) and checks that ac 0 ∈ [0..A).
It sets
On input a database commitment T and a selection value σ ∈ {1, . . . , N }, it works as follows: , c 1 , c 2 , t 1 , t 2 ) :
It picks random y
POTRespond(crs, T , sk , D i−1 , Q). On input a database commitment T , a secret key sk , private state D i−1 , and a request Q, it works as follows:
1. It parses crs to obtain (crs
2. It verifies pok 1 by running PKVerify on input crs B P K and it aborts if the output is reject. For this verification, it uses the commitments D i−1 and D i .
It computes
2 ) and z = z 1 · z 2 . 4. It runs PKProve on input crs V P K to compute a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge 3 pok 2 :
To let this proof be zero-knowledge we introduce a new variable z3. The set of equations is e(z1, w1)e(d 5. It outputs R = (z , pok 2 ) and D i .
POTComplete(crs, T , R, Q (priv )
). On input a database commitment T , a response R and private state Q (priv ) :
1. It parses crs to obtain (crs V P K , h 3 ), T as (pk , C 1 , . . . , C N ), R as (z , pok 2 ) and Q (priv ) as (Q, σ, y 1 , y 2 ). ).
It verifies pok
Theorem 2 This POT scheme securely realizes F P OT . We prove Theorem 2 in Appendix C.
Properties and Extensions
This scheme offers extra features over previous ones [1] . Namely, it permits that several messages have the same price without scaling up prices and accounts, and it allows the vendor to charge different prices for the same message to different buyers, which can be used to apply marketing techniques like making discounts to regular or underage buyers. This can be done by recomputing the signatures included in the ciphertexts on different prices depending on the particular buyer. In order to allow for a precomputed database, V can assign buyers to different groups and associate to each group j ∈ {1, . . . , } a different price for each message m i by signing s (j) = Sign n (crs Sig , Sk , (r 1 , r 2 , j, p ij )). (Note that r 1 and r 2 have the same value in the signatures of all the groups in order to reuse the same encryption of m i .) In the transfer phase, when proving possession of the multi-block P-signature s (j) for their group, buyers must reveal the attribute j.
The POT scheme can be simplified to obtain an OT scheme, which constitutes an alternative to the one in [26] . Additionally, the multi-block signature scheme provides high flexibility to implement other access control policies for oblivious transfer beyond those required for POT. For example, if an index i is signed instead of price p i , then access control methods based on stateful anonymous credentials [18] , which support a wide variety of policies, can be applied.
Efficiency Analysis and Comparison
In Table 1 we compare the performance of our POT scheme with the performance of the OT scheme in [26] and with the OT scheme obtained by simplifying our POT scheme. We show the number of group elements in the crs, in the database T , in the request message, and in the response message. (We recall that the deposit upper bound is A = d a .) See Appendix D for more details.
A Universally composable security
We review the universally composable security paradigm presented in [15] . First, we briefly explain the computational model, which is intended to represent multiple interacting computer programs. Then we review the protocol security definition: the model of protocol execution, the notion of ideal functionality and the definition of security. Finally, we recall the concept of hybrid protocol and the composition theorem.
Computational model. In order to represent a network of communicating computer programs, [15] utilizes a system of interactive Turing machines instances (ITI) that are provided with additional communication tapes which can be written into by one ITI and read by another. In contrast to an interactive Turing machine (ITM), which represents a static object (a program or algorithm), an ITI is an ITM running on some specific data. There are two methods for ITI intercommunication: communication through the communication tapes, which models untrusted communication over a network, and communication through the input and subroutine output tapes, which models local subroutine calls.
An execution of a system (I, C) is modeled as a sequence of activations of ITIs, where in each activation a single ITI is active. In the beginning, an initial ITI (I) is invoked on some external input. This ITI can perform local computations and also invoke other ITIs and write information on their corresponding tapes (in each activation, the tape of only one ITI may be written). Once an ITI is invoked, it can invoke other ITIs and write their tapes. When an ITI enters a waiting state, then the ITI whose input tape was written becomes active. If the tape of no other ITI is written, then the initial ITI is activated, and the execution ends when the initial ITI halts. There exists a control function C that determines which tapes of which ITIs can be written to by each ITI. Let OU T I,C (κ, x) denote the random variable that describes the output of the execution of the system (I, C), where κ is I's security parameter and x is I's input.
The identity of an ITI is determined at invocation time by the invoking instance and it is unchangeable. Each identity consists of two separate fields: a session id (sid ) and a party id (pid). A protocol instance is a set of ITIs in a system's execution that at a certain moment have the same program and the same sid . The pid is used to differentiate ITIs within a protocol instance.
Protocol security. [15] explains the model of protocol execution in the presence of an adversary and in a given environment. This model is parameterized by three ITMs: the protocol ψ, which determines the program to be executed by parties in a protocol instance, the adversary A, and the environment Z, which represents all the protocols running in the system and the adversaries acting within them (including protocols that interact with ψ). Z is the initial ITI. The control function defines that A should be the first ITI to be invoked. Afterwards, Z can communicate with A or provide inputs to parties that have the program ψ and that have the same sid , which is fixed by Z. A can write a message in the communication tape of a party, corrupt a party (only when instructed to do so by Z), or send information to Z. A party of ψ can write a message in the communication tape of A (and not in the one of other ITI), write outputs to the subroutine output tape of Z, or invoke ITIs as subroutines. The execution finishes when Z outputs a single bit. Remarkably, we note that Z has access to the input and output of the parties, but neither to the communication between them nor to the inputs and outputs of their subroutines, while A has only access to the communication between parties. Nevertheless, Z and A can exchange information between two activations of some party.
In order to prove that a protocol ψ is secure, ψ is compared with an ideal protocol within the above model of protocol execution. The ideal protocol involves an ideal functionality F that acts as a trusted ITM that carries out the desired task. In the ideal protocol execution, each party forwards its input to F and copies any output coming from F to its local output. F has instructions to compute the desired outputs given the inputs. In addition, F can receive messages from adversary E and can be instructed to send messages to E, which models the influence that E may have on the output of the parties, the information that E may obtain, or the delay that E can apply to the outputs.
A protocol ψ is secure if ψ securely realizes F, which implies that ψ emulates the ideal protocol. Emulation means that for any A there exists a simulator 4 E such that, for any Z and on any input, the advantage of Z in guessing whether it is interacting with A and ψ or with E and the ideal protocol is negligible. More formally, let IDEAL F ,E,Z denote the ensemble of random variables {OU T Z,C(F ,E) (κ, x)} κ∈N,x∈{0,1} * and let REAL ψ,A,Z denote {OU T Z,C(ψ,A) (κ, x)} κ∈N,x∈{0,1} * . ψ securely realizes F if these ensembles are computationally indistinguishable. Intuitively, if ψ securely realizes F then it is guaranteed that the outputs of the parties when running ψ are indistinguishable from their outputs when interacting with F on the same input, and that A does not learn more information when interacting with ψ than when interacting with F.
Hybrid protocol. An F-hybrid protocol is a protocol where parties, besides communicating with A as usual, make calls to instances of the ideal functionality F by invoking the ideal protocol of F. F can be thought as an ideal service that is provided in the network.
Composition theorem. Let ψ be a protocol that makes subroutine calls to a protocol φ, and let ρ be a protocol that emulates φ. Then the composed protocol ψ ρ/φ , where each invocation of φ is replaced with an invocation of ρ, emulates ψ. As a corollary, if ψ is an F-hybrid protocol and ρ securely realizes F, then the composed protocol ψ ρ/F emulates ψ. This theorem includes the traditional notion of concurrent self composition [34] , where many instances of the same protocol run concurrently.
B Proof of Theorem 1
We refer to [4] for a formal definition of F -unforgeability. We consider two types of forgeries. In type 1 the forger D sends (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) and F (m 1 , . . . , m n ) such that, for q = 1 to l , s 1 = s 
Type 1 forgeries:
We construct an algorithm E that breaks the l -HSDH assumption with non-negligible probability if there exists a forger D that outputs a type 1 forgery with non-negligible probability. E takes as input an l -HSDH tuple that consists of (g, g α ) ∈ G 2 , u ∈ G, an l -tuple {g 1/(α+cq) , g cq , u cq } l q=1 and a description of the groups (p, G, G T ). E computes a tuple (g 1/(α+c) , g c , u c ) such that, ∀q, c = c q , as follows:
and hands them to D.
Keygen n (crs Sig ). E picks random (β 1 , . . . , β n , λ 1 , . . . , λ n ) ← Z p and calculates a public key Pk
OSign n (crs Sig , Sk , m). At the qth query, q ∈ {1, . . . , l }, E implicitly sets c q = r + n i=1 β i m i and computes (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) as follows:
4 Adversary E is often called simulator because typically in security proofs E operates by simulating A.
Forgery. D outputs a forgery (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) = (g 1/(α+r +β 1 m 1 +...+βn mn ) , g r , u r ) and (g
β i m i and computes an HSDH tuple (A, B, C) as follows:
Type 2 forgeries: We construct an algorithm E that breaks the l -TDH assumption with non-negligible probability if there exists a forger D that outputs a type 2 forgery with non-negligible probability. E takes as input a l -TDH tuple that consists of (g, g x , g y ) ∈ G 3 , an l -tuple {c q , g 1/(x +cq) } l q=1 and a description of the groups (p, G, G T ). E computes a (g µx , g µy , g µxy ) as follows:
, where u = g y , and hands them to D.
OSign n (crs Sig , Sk , m). In the qth query, E sets c q = (α + r + n i=1,i =t β i m i )/γm t , where q ∈ {1, . . . , l }. Then (x + c q )γm t = α + r + n i=1 β i m i is the inverse of the exponent that should be used to compute s 1 . Therefore, E sets r = c q γm
. E already has a message-signature pair such that r +
t − m t )γ. E computes a TDH tuple (A, B, C) as follows:
C Proof of Theorem 2
In order to prove this theorem, we need to build a simulator E that invokes a copy of adversary A and interacts with F P OT and environment Z in such a way that ensembles IDEAL F P OT ,E,Z and REAL P OT ,A,Z are computationally indistinguishable.
In our proof we make use of the fact that Groth-Sahai proofs are partially extractable, composable witness-indistinguishable, and (given certain conditions) composable zero-knowledge. The following algorithms formalize these properties and are needed for the security proofs.
PKExtractSetup(1 κ ). It outputs a tuple crs P K that is identically distributed to the output of PKSetup (1 κ ) and an extraction trapdoor td ext .
PKExtract(crs P K , td ext , y, pok ). It uses td ext to extract the witnesses w from pok . The algorithm does not extract the openings of the commitments.
PKSimSetup(1 κ ). It outputs an alternative setup crs P K and a simulation trapdoor td sim .
PKSimProve(crs P K , td sim , y). Given simulation parameters crs P K , it outputs a proof pok for instance y such that PKVerify(crs P K , y, pok ) outputs accept. 5 Groth-Sahai proofs fulfill the correctness property. (PKExtSetup, PKExtract) are a polynomial time extractor that allows for perfect extractability of the witness, i.e., extraction is done with probability 1. However, if we have a commitment Commit(x , open), then PKExtract extracts x but not the opening open.
Groth-Sahai proofs are composable witness-indistinguishable, but only for some classes of statements they fulfill the stronger notion of composable zero-knowledge.
Composable Witness-Indistinguishability. We require two properties: (1) the parameters crs P K output by PKSimSetup are computationally indistinguishable from crs P K output by PKSetup, and (2) all (information theoretic) adversaries A have advantage 0 in the following game:
1. A receives crs P K as generated by PKSimSetup.
2.
A outputs an instance y and two valid witnesses (w 0 , w 1 ).
3.
A receives a proof pok = PKProve(crs P K , y, w b ), where b is a random bit. Composable Zero-Knowledge. There exists a simulator (PKSimSetup, PKSimProve) that fulfills two properties: (1) the parameters crs P K output by PKSimSetup are computationally indistinguishable from the parameters crs P K output by PKSetup, and (2) all (information theoretic) adversaries A have advantage 0 in the following game:
1. A receives crs P K and td sim as generated by PKSimSetup.
2.
A outputs an instance y and a valid witness w .
3. Let pok 0 = PKProve(crs P K , y, w ) and pok 1 = PKSimProve(crs P K , td sim , y). Pick a random bit b. A receives pok b .
A sends its guess b . Its advantage is
Simulation of buyer's security. In this case only the vendor V is corrupted.
1. E runs algorithm PKSetup to generate two Groth-Sahai reference strings crs B P K and crs V P K for the same pairing group setup (p, G, G T , e, g), where −p max > A mod p holds. E picks random u ← G. E picks random a, b, c ← Z p , first computes h 3 = g c and then ), and sends Q to A. Upon receiving the response R from A, E runs POTComplete (crs, T , R, Q (priv ) ). If the output is reject, E sends (sid , 0) to F P OT . Otherwise, E sends (sid , 1) to F P OT and keeps D Simulation of vendor's security. In this case only the buyer B is corrupted.
1. E runs algorithm PKExtractSetup to obtain crs B P K and an extraction trapdoor td ext , and algorithm PKSimSetup to obtain crs V P K and a simulation trapdoor td sim . Both use the same pairing group setup (p, G, G T , e, g), where −p max > A mod p holds. E picks random a, b, c ← Z p and computes (h 1 , h 2 , h 3 ) = (g a , g b , g c ). E picks random u ← G and sets crs = (crs V P K , Otherwise, E executes PKExtract(crs B P K , td ext , pok 1 ) to extract the witness. Then, for i = 1 to N , E compares the signature (g
in the witness with each of the signatures that are included in the ciphertexts that were sent to A in order to know the choice σ i selected by A. E also compares the signatures {g σ j , u σ j , S σ j } a−1 j=0 in the witness that correspond to the range proof with each of the signatures that were sent to A in params Range . (This is done in order to ensure that A did not compute a forgery.) E stores D i and sends (sid , buyer , σ i ) to F P OT in order to obtain either ⊥ or the message m σ i . For the former, E sends (sid , ⊥) to A. Otherwise E uses the value of the ciphertext c 5 = m i · h and the values (t 1 , t 2 ) = (h
3 ) in the extracted witness to compute a response z = (c 5 t 1 t 2 )/m σ i , and uses trapdoor td sim to simulate proof pok 2 . E sets R = (z , pok 2 ) and sends (sid , R) to A.
Simulation when none of the parties is corrupted. After receiving (sid , p 1 , . . . , p N ) and k messages of the form (sid , b), E creates a simulated transcript by running copies of honest V and B. V is run on input random messages (m 1 , . . . , m N ) and prices (p 1 , . . . , p N ) while B is run on input an account ac 0 such that ac 0 > p σ min k, where σ min denotes the item with the lowest price. In the ith transfer phase, B receives as input σ min . If b i = 0 then V sends a invalid response (sid , ⊥). Otherwise V sends a valid response.
Simulation when V and B are corrupted. In this case E knows the inputs to B and V and so E can simulate by computing the real messages that are sent by the two parties.
Claim 1 (Buyer security) When only V is corrupted, then IDEAL F P OT ,E,Z and REAL P OT ,A,Z are computationally indistinguishable under the DLIN assumption.
Proof. We show by means of a series of hybrid games that the environment Z cannot distinguish between the real execution ensemble REAL P OT ,A,Z and the simulated ensemble IDEAL F P OT ,E,Z with non-negligible probability. We denote by Pr [Game i] the probability that Z distinguishes between the ensemble of Game i and that of the real execution. Game 1: This game proceeds as Game 0, except that to generate crs we pick random a, b, c ← Z p , first compute h 3 = g c and then Game 2: This game proceeds as Game 1, except that message P = (w
) is replaced by another valid message that is computed by using the same value ac 0 , so both messages are identically distributed. Therefore, |Pr E performs all the changes described in Game 3, but, for i = 1 to N , E uses the ciphertexts that are sent by A to compute messages m i = c 5 /(c a 3 c b 4 ), gets p i and sends (sid , vendor , m 1 , . . . , m N , p 1 , . . . , p N ) to F P OT . Upon receiving ac 0 from F P OT , E computes P by following POTInitBuyer, and stores private state D (priv ) 0 . In the ith transfer, E computes a request for σ min by using D . E also plays the role of the verifier when A sends the response. (We note that, since we use the item with the lowest price, A never rejects because there are not enough funds. Note that F P OT asks the vendor whether he wants to make the transfer fail after checking that the buyer has enough funds.) If the response is not valid, E sends b = 0 to F P OT . Otherwise E sends b = 1 to F P OT . The distribution produced in Game 3 is identical to that of our simulation. Therefore, we have that |Pr [Game 3] ≤ ν(κ). Proof. We show by means of a series of hybrid games that the environment Z cannot distinguish between the real execution ensemble REAL P OT ,A,Z and the simulated ensemble IDEAL F P OT ,E,Z with non-negligible probability. We again denote by Pr [Game i] the probability that Z distinguishes between the ensemble of Game i and that of the real execution. Game 1: This game proceeds as Game 0, except that to set crs we run PKExtractSetup to obtain crs B P K and an extraction trapdoor td ext , and PKSimSetup to obtain crs V P K and a simulation trapdoor td sim . Both use the same pairing group setup (p, G, G T , e, g ), where −p max > A mod p holds. We pick random a, b, c ← Z p and compute (h 1 , h 2 , h 3 ) = (g a , g b , g c ) . We also pick random u ← G and set crs = (crs V P K , crs B P K , u, h 1 , h 2 , h 3 ). crs B P K computed as above is identically distributed to the output of PKSetup. If the DLIN assumption holds, then crs V P K generated as above is computationally indistinguishable from that generated by PKSetup, and thus 3 , s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) do not equal to any of the signatures included in the ciphertexts C 1 , . . . , C N that where sent to A in the initialization phase. This means that A computed a forged signature of the multi-block P-Signature scheme. Otherwise, we get the selection value σ i . The probability that Z distinguishes between Game 2 and Game 3 is bounded by the following lemma: Proof. We build a forger D that breaks the F -unforgeability of the single-message P-signature scheme with non-negligible probability. Given such a forger, in [4] it is shown how to construct an algorithm E that breaks either the d -HSDH assumption or the d -TDH assumption with nonnegligible probability.
Given a buyer that causes Game 4 to abort with non-negligible probability, D works as follows:
1. D obtains the parameters of the signature scheme crs Sig = (p, G, G T , e, g, u) from E, runs
PKExtractSetup to get (crs B P K , td ext ), PKSetup to get crs V P K , and computes (h 1 , h 2 , h 3 ) = (g a , g b , g c ). D sets crs = (crs V P K , crs B P K , u, h 1 , h 2 , h 3 ). 2. D obtains the public key of the signature scheme Pk from E. j=0 that are employed in the range proof. If there exists a signature {g σ j , u σ j , S σ j } that does not equal any of the signatures {(g i , u i , S i )} i∈Z d in params Range , then D outputs this tuple {g σ j , u σ j , S σ j } as a forgery. and the values (t 1 , t 2 ) = (h 2 = z , where z is the honestly generated response. The proof pok 2 is computed by running PKSimProve and using td sim . A simulated proof is indistinguishable from a proof computed by algorithm PKProve under the DLIN assumption. Therefore, the probability that Z distinguishes between Game 5 and (m 1 , . . . , m N ) of G when computing POTInitVendor. Now pok 2 is a proof of an invalid statement, and is simulated by using td sim . The probability that Z distinguishes between Game 6 and Game 5 is bounded by the following claim: Proof. We construct an algorithm T that breaks the DLIN assumption given an environment Z that distinguishes Game 5 from Game 6 with non-negligible probability. On input a DLIN tuple (g, g a , g b , g ac , g bd , z), T works as follows:
1. T sets (g 1 , g 2 ) = (g a , g b ). T picks random δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 , δ 4 , δ 5 , δ 6 ← Z p and computes (w 1 , w 2 ) = (g 2 ). 2. T picks random γ, µ ← Z p and computes h 3 = g γ and u = g µ . T runs PKExtractSetup and PKSimSetup to obtain (crs B P K , td ext ) and (crs V P K , td sim ) respectively. T sets crs = (crs V P K , crs B P K , u, h 1 , h 2 , h 3 ). 3. T picks random (α, β 3 , λ 3 ) ← Z p and computes (v , g 3 , u 3 ) = (g α , g β 3 , u λ 3 ). T sets Pk = (v , g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ).
be the upper bound of the deposit. In the initialization phase, V sends T , where each ciphertext has 12 elements of G and the public key consists of 2 elements plus 7 elements of the public key of the signature scheme plus 2 + 3d elements of the parameters of the range proof (where each signature consists of 3 elements and the public key has 2 elements). In total they sum 11 + 3d + 12N elements of G. B sends an encryption of the account that consists of 5 elements of G. In each transfer phase, B sends a request that has two elements of G and a proof pok 1 , which consists of 5 pairing product equations (N l = 4, N nl = 1, Q a = 8, Q b = 1) to prove possession of a multi-block signature, 4 equations (N l = 4, N nl = 0, Q a = 8, Q b = 0) to prove that the request is correctly computed, 1 equation (N l = 1, N nl = 0, Q a = 3, Q b = 0) to prove that ac i = ac i−1 − p σ i , and 3a + 1 equations (N l = 1+2a, N nl = a, Q a = 5a +1, Q b = a) to prove that ac i ∈ [0..d a ). In total, pok 1 has parameters (N eq = 11 + 3a, m = 15 + 5a, N l = 10 + 2a, N nl = 1 + a, Q a = 20 + 5a, Q b = 1 + a) and thus comprises 84 + 30a elements of G and requires the computation of 300 + 87a pairings for verification. V sends back one element of G and a proof pok 2 , which has parameters (N eq = 4, m = 3, N l = 3, N nl = 1, Q a = 6, Q b = 1) and thus comprises 27 elements of G and requires 111 pairings for verification.
